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Summary
The 1996 welfare reform that attempted to
get lone parents out of social assistance repre-
sents a major shift in social policy in the
Netherlands. Instead of having the financial
right to care for their children, lone mothers
are now obliged to earn their living by paid
work as soon as their youngest child reaches
the age of five. This policy shift is accompa-
nied by additional incentives to support lone
mothers in engaging in (part-time) work.
Nevertheless, the measure has met consider-
able resistance among lone mothers as well as
the caseworkers and municipalities that have
been granted discretionary powers to imple-
ment the new law. Several years after its intro-
duction, it can be concluded that the law has
not been very successful; only slightly more
than one out of ten lone mothers have actually
left social assistance. In this article, we explain
these meagre results by analysing the assump-
tions and incentives of the national policies,
and by describing the mechanisms of discre-
tion at a local level.
Résumé
La réforme sociale de 1996 dont l’objectif est
de sortir le parent isolé de l’assistance sociale
constitue un tournant essentiel dans la poli-
tique sociale des Pays-Bas. Au lieu de disposer
d’un droit à s’occuper de leurs enfants, les
mères célibataires sont maintenant obligées de
gagner leur vie par un travail rémunéré aus-
sitôt que leur plus jeune enfant atteint l’âge de
5 ans. Ce tournant politique s’accompagne
par des mesures financières de soutien pour les
mères célibataires qui travaillent (à temps
partiel). Cependant, ces dispositions ont ren-
contré une considérable résistance parmi
celles-ci ainsi que parmi les travailleurs
sociaux et les municipalités qui avaient reçu
des pouvoirs discrétionnaires pour mettre en
œuvre cette nouvelle loi. Plusieurs années
après son introduction, nous pouvons con-
clure que cette loi n’a pas eu le succès
escompté, un peu plus d’un dixième des mères
célibataires ont quitté l’assistance sociale.
Nous expliquons dans cet article ces maigres
résultats en analysant les hypothèses sous-
jacentes et les avantages financiers des poli-
tiques nationales et en décrivant les
mécanismes discrétionnaires au plan local.
The Netherlands: a deviant case
Wherever changes in policy concerning lone
mothers took place in the 1990s, it was an
attempt to get lone mothers out of their
homes and into the labour market in order to
earn their own living by paid work. The justi-
fications for these changing policies as well as
the character of the incentives are rather
diverse. While in the USA a moral stigmatiza-
tion of lone mothers – accompanied by a
racial discourse – goes hand in hand with
punitive employment policies, in the UK a
moral stigmatization is associated with a more
supportive working policy which offers
encouragement. In contrast, countries like
Denmark, Sweden and Finland lack any moral
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stigmatization of lone mothers but neverthe-
less stress the importance of paid work. These
countries introduced all kinds of care and
financial support for lone mothers as early as
the 1980s (Hobson, 1994; Lewis, 1997;
Millar, 1996; Orloff, 1999). The Netherlands
deviates from other countries in several
aspects. The Dutch welfare reform of 1996
that required lone mothers to find work was
not inspired by a moral stigmatization of lone
motherhood. In the process of developing the
welfare reform, the lifestyle of the largest
social category that was affected by its conse-
quences (65 percent of welfare beneficiaries at
that time were lone mothers) was not con-
tested. Apart from some debates in parliament
about cohabitation fraud and the issue of how
old the children should be when a mother
could be expected to earn her own living,
hardly any attention was paid to either the
assumptions or the implications of the new
law for lone mothers (Knijn, 1994;
Bussemaker et al., 1997). The Dutch case also
deviates from other countries because, on the
face of it, there was no reason for changing
the law relating to the position of lone
mothers. In contrast to, for instance, the USA
and UK, the percentage of single parent 
families has not increased since the 1970s. In
addition, and unlike the USA and the
Scandinavian countries, single mothers in the
Netherlands are almost as much in employ-
ment as those with partners (respectively 42
percent and 45 percent). If employed, lone
mothers work even more hours a week than
mothers with partners do (Niphuis-Nell,
1997). Finally, the Dutch situation deviates
from the Scandinavian ones because the
Netherlands lacks an infrastructure of care
that can support working lone mothers. There
are long waiting lists for child-care centres as
well as after-school provisions. In this respect,
the Netherlands resembles the USA and UK.
But while this was the reason for the British
government not to require lone parents to
become employed until their children reached
the age of 16, the Dutch social/democratic/
liberal coalition requires lone parents to find
work when their youngest child reaches the
age of 5 (Millar and Rowlingson, 2001).
Welfare reform in the Netherlands was
aimed at getting lone mothers off welfare in
order to free them from poverty and social
isolation, and to liberate them from their
status as housewives for emancipation
reasons. In addition, this reform was intended
to result in a reduction of social security
budgets. Finding steady work was perceived
to be the major means to reach these goals.
Until now (four years after the reform’s intro-
duction), few successes have been achieved. In
the following, we will explain these poor
results. Three aspects will be stressed: first, the
diffuse character of national social policy;
second, the characteristics of lone mothers on
welfare; third, administrative reluctance to
implement national policies. An underlying
argument relates to the gender assumptions of
this reform. How are rights and obligations
redefined and how are Dutch lone mothers
assumed to fulfil these new rights and obliga-
tions? We will see if these assumptions concur
with the attitudes and practices of lone
mothers and, if not, what category of lone
mothers do not share these assumptions or are
unable to meet the demands. In this part of
the article, we will include income packages1
of different groups of lone mothers. Finally,
we will analyse the cultural norms of local
policymakers and caseworkers who have to
mediate between the national policies and
lone mothers on welfare, to see how they con-
tribute to the welfare reform. The article is
based upon two studies among lone parents in
the Netherlands.2 The first study, conducted in
1998, includes a survey of 1,049 Dutch lone
mothers on welfare, and interviews with 50
local policymakers and caseworkers in five
cities. The second study comprised a follow-
up survey of 452 of the respondents of the
first study and a survey of 688 lone parents
not on welfare (Knijn and Van Wel, 1999; Van
Wel and Knijn, 2000). This second study pro-
vides an explanation of why lone mothers did
or did not come off welfare and also a com-
parison of the characteristics and motives of
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lone mothers on welfare with those of lone
parents who earn a living in paid employ-
ment.3
Financial and moral rationalities
Current welfare reforms are intended to work
on more than one level; by increasing lone
mothers’ employment rates, reductions in
social security expenditure as well as reduc-
tions in the poverty of lone-mother families
could be realized. After describing several
studies on the relationship between poverty
among lone mothers and social policies in dif-
ferent countries, Millar (1996) states that
some factors that influence the outcome for
lone mothers are becoming clearer. She men-
tions, among others, the basis for entitlements
(as a worker, mother or wife); the universal or
means-tested basis of entitlements; the rights
to services; and the character of family
dependencies and support. There is no doubt
that welfare regimes matter in poverty rates of
lone-mother families; these rates are much
higher in the so-called residual welfare states
such as the USA than in the so-called social-
democratic welfare states such as Denmark
and Sweden (Mitchell, 1993; Hobson, 1994).
But it is acknowledged that aside from these
two extremes, very complex configurations of
policies and practices are responsible for the
position of lone mothers. Firstly, because
social policies operate in quite different social
contexts. What might be helpful in one
country can be counterproductive in another,
and vice versa, and the same outcome may be
the result of very contrasting social policies. In
Lewis’s book, Lone Mothers in European
Welfare Regimes (1997), case-studies in Italy
and Denmark showed that poverty rates in
both countries are at a similar low level, a
conclusion confirmed by a regression analysis
of LIS data made by Plantenga (1999). The
employment rates of lone mothers in both
countries are also comparable (Bimbi, 1997;
Siim, 1997). These outcomes nevertheless
result from completely different social policies
and can only be understood in the context of
very different social practices. In Italy, the
majority of lone mothers are widows sup-
ported by small pensions and by the fact that
their family takes care of the children. In
Denmark, in contrast, the majority of lone
mothers are separated or divorced, and are
supported by special allowances for lone-
parent families and good-quality public child
care. Both kinds of support result in higher
and often full-time employment for lone
mothers, and in better levels of income than in
many other countries. By implication, lone
mothers in Denmark depend on the combina-
tion of work and state support, while in Italy
lone mothers depend on the combination of
work and family support.
Establishing the consequences of social
policy towards lone mothers therefore
requires knowledge about the specific charac-
ter of the welfare regime and the relationships
between the state, family and market. It also
requires the outcome to be well defined. As
the cases of Denmark and Italy show, the
outcome may be very different when one
looks at poverty and employment rates rather
than defining the rates of dependency on the
family. In identifying the relationship between
poverty among lone mothers and social poli-
cies, Lewis (1997) states that lone mothers do
best in countries where they both work and
receive state benefits, or where the govern-
ment is generous in supporting all mothers to
stay at home. She warns, however, that the
latter does not always result in decent
incomes. Indeed, social assistance pro-
grammes are rather vulnerable to economic
pressure and cut-backs in social benefits
because they are not formulated as citizenship
rights. The case of Ireland and currently also
the Netherlands (Plantenga, 1999) show that
when the exclusion of lone mothers from the
labour market is accompanied by cuts in bene-
fits, lone mothers can easily become impover-
ished. This is also in accordance with what
Orloff says about the risks of discretionary
social assistance which is not based upon citi-
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zenship rights. Coming from a residual
welfare state like the USA, she stresses that
‘Such aid, while preventing utter destitution, is
less effective as a counterweight to dominant
social forces in markets and families, than are
the programs that take the form of social
rights’ (Orloff, 1999).
Current welfare reforms concerning lone
parents include a limitation of the right to
social assistance. Access is limited by reducing
the duration of welfare, by demanding partici-
pation in training programmes or by introduc-
ing the obligation to find a job when the
children have reached a certain age. However,
new rights have been introduced, such as the
right to tax reduction for working single
parents, the right to claim additional educa-
tion and the right to child-care support
(Millar, 1996; Orloff, 1999). In fact, most
welfare reforms concerning single mothers
imply a transformation from rights based
upon caring motherhood to rights based upon
employed motherhood. These new social
rights based upon employed motherhood
assume that lone mothers prefer work and
income above caring for their children, or feel
obliged to accept work because of welfare
pressure. Duncan and Edwards comment on
these assumptions in many social policy
studies by stating that:
The model of the rational economic man
also underpins much research in the social
policy tradition. One example is the influen-
tial body of work advocating an expansion
of day care to allow lone (and other)
mothers to take up paid work. Here
cost–benefit analyses are employed to esti-
mate the financial results for both state
expenditure and lone mothers’ incomes
(1996: 118).
The rational economic assumptions underly-
ing many social policy studies do indeed
suppose that either a punitive regime (sanc-
tions and exclusion) or a supportive regime
(offering child care and tax reductions) will
respectively enforce or stimulate lone mothers
to find work and to earn their own living.
Instead, Duncan and Edwards suggest that
lone mothers’ individual economic calcula-
tions need to be placed in the framework of
gendered moral rationalities that are con-
structed, negotiated and sustained socially in
particular contexts (1996: 121). This implies
that gender aspects do not only operate on the
level of social policy constructing (new)
gender identities of, in this case, lone mothers,
as is suggested by many social policy scholars,
but also constitute lone mothers’ reaction to
social policies. Despite the fact that Duncan
and Edwards use a rather diffuse concept
(gendered moral rationalities), their claim for
including lone mothers as actors in dealing
with social policy is very valuable. Also their
plea for taking varying cultural norms and
attitudes of lone mothers into account makes
sense, in particular when one could expect a
lot of variation in practices and attitudes
among different (sub) groups of lone mothers.
Finally, comparing the gender assumptions of
lone mothers themselves with those of
national and local policymakers might provide
a good basis for detecting the discrepancies
between social policy and lone mothers’
assumptions. 
Lone mothers as a social problem
Welfare reform in the Netherlands has been
the subject of debate since the end of the
1980s, which finally led to a parliamentary
decision in 1994. On 1 January 1996, the new
General Social Assistance Act (nABW: nieuwe
Algemene Bijstandswet) came into practice
which stated that lone mothers are obliged to
seek work in order to earn their own income
once their youngest child reaches the age of 5.
The new act also gave discretion to the local
level, implying that local welfare offices had
to develop their own instruments to imple-
ment the law. Since its introduction in 1965
social assistance has covered all people who
are unable to earn their own living and are not
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entitled to work-related unemployment
benefit because they do not meet its criteria.
Apart from lone mothers, social assistance
covers claimants who have too short or irreg-
ular a work history, such as unemployed
youngsters leaving school, artists and addicts.
That lone mothers constituted more than 60
percent of the social assistance beneficiaries
was the result of an unintentional social prac-
tice to exclude single mothers from the work
obligation, which has been in place since the
1970s and was sanctioned in the 1980s. From
this time, single mothers have been entitled to
benefits on the basis of the so-called ABW-sec
clause (Social Assistance-sec), implying that
they receive a means-tested benefit of about
70 percent of the minimum wage level till
their children reach the age of 16 (Knijn,
1994; Bussemaker et al., 1997).
The first political debates about welfare
reform did not, however, initially focus on
lone mothers. On the contrary, when the first
proposals to change the social assistance law
were discussed in 1989, they concerned the
simplification and decentralization of the so-
called re-activation of welfare recipients. It
was suggested that the lower level discre-
tionary bodies – that is, the municipalities,
and their welfare and employment offices –
should be able to provide better support to
individuals returning to the labour market.
Lone mothers entered the picture due to the
suggestion in a research report that cohabita-
tion fraud was widespread (Onderzoeks-
commissie ABW, research committee ABW
1993). Although the extent of such fraud was
never confirmed, the arguments appeared rea-
sonable: the social assistance means-test
meant it was tempting for lone mothers on
welfare not to inform their caseworker that
they were living together with a partner who
was earning. This report resulted in consider-
able uproar and political and public debate
about individual lone mothers’ right to
privacy and autonomy versus moral obliga-
tions and solidarity, with the latter’s underly-
ing implication of not abusing collective
means. Instead of discussing the individual
right to social assistance, politicians were
eager to change the ‘protected’ status of lone
mothers, who, under the new law, have to
prove that they live without an adult partner.
During the process in which the new social
assistance law was created, the decentraliza-
tion of responsibilities to a local level, the acti-
vation principle and the extension of the work
obligation to larger groups of beneficiaries
proved, indeed, to be the main principles (see
also Finn, 2000). Some parliamentary debates
focussed on lone mothers, in particular on the
question of how old the children should be
when a mother was supposed to earn her own
living. At first, it was suggested that mothers
with children below the age of 12 should be
exempted. Ter Veld, the Parliamentary under-
secretary of social affairs, stated as early as
1992:
The age of 12 years for the youngest child is
included in the law, albeit not as an
absolute criterion but as a guideline for
local authorities who are given the discre-
tion, in case a mother has to take care of
one or more children below the age of
twelve years, to adjust the work obligation
accordingly so that the responsibilities con-
cerning the care for and education of the
children can be fulfilled. (TK, 1992–1993:
83)
However, this age indication is not present
in the laws proposed in the subsequent years
and it is not included in the final text of the
law the government addressed to parliament,
which included every lone mother, regardless
of the age of the children. On the initiative of
one of the very small orthodox Christian
parties (the Calvinist Political Bond, GPV)
parliament finally decided that such a loose
end in the law was not acceptable. It decided
to introduce the work obligation only for lone
mothers with children of school age, that is,
children of 5 years and above (Weuring,
1996). The welfare reform came into effect 
on 1 January 1996. Although parliament had
tied up one loose end by accepting the age
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indication of the youngest child, many other
aspects of the law were still open for interpre-
tation. Although the law says, ‘the new rules
are in principle applicable to all welfare
claimants’, it also states that:
municipalities will have to consider the
presence of young children. This will enable
municipalities to adjust the re-entry into the
labour market according to the individual
possibilities of those involved. It is women
in particular, the main category of claimants
of the ABW-sec, who might benefit from
this new law. The current welfare regime
too often results in an automatic denial of
their work potential if they are not required
to work. A needless dependence on welfare
is ultimately not in the interest of these
claimants. (TK, 1993–1994: 23)
Paradoxically, this reform has been a major
turning point in the assumptions regarding
motherhood in the Netherlands. It was,
however, not inspired by an increase in the
proportion of lone mothers, since, for
decades, about 10 percent of all families with
children below the age of 18 have been lone-
parent families. Nor was it based upon a
moral taboo on lone motherhood as such,
which is regarded as just another type of
family by the majority of the Dutch popula-
tion (Van den Avort et al., 1996). Until the
shift in the social assistance law, it was
assumed that lone mothers cared for their
children full time just as most mothers with
partners do; about 40 percent of both cate-
gories of mothers are employed, although
partnered mothers work fewer hours per week
than lone mothers do. Why has the Dutch
parliament accepted without adequate debate
such a dramatic shift in national policy that
goes against the ‘gendered moral rationality’
of stay-at-home motherhood and concerns a
rather vulnerable and politically and publicly
uncontested category of mothers?
A process that paved the way for this
reform was the changing composition of the
category of lone mothers (see Table 1).
Although the rates of lone-parent families
have not increased at all in the Netherlands
since the 1970s, their composition has
changed dramatically.
From a group that mainly consisted of
widows in the early 1970s, it developed into
one that mainly consisted of divorced (63
percent) and unmarried (24 percent) mothers
in the early 1990s. The number of lone
mothers (not widows because they receive
widows’ pensions) claiming social assistance
therefore increased from 60,000 in 1978 to
103,000 in 1991 (Niphuis-Nell, 1997). Their
poverty rates also increased since in the early
1980s welfare benefits were not linked to
average wage growth. In the early 1990s, it
was recognized that lone parents, and in par-
ticular lone mothers, are especially vulnerable
to long-term poverty; in 1997 27 percent of
mother-headed lone-parent families were in
long-term poverty, while 18 percent of single
women (mainly elderly) and 3 percent of 
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Table 1 Historical changes in lone-parent families in the Netherlands
1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
As percent of all families 
with dependent children 8 10 11 10 12
Proportion of whom:
Widowed 27 16 9 8 3
Divorced 54 58 60 63 52.8
Separated 8 9 7 5 21.7
Never-married 10 17 23 24 22.5
Sources: Figures for 1981 to 1993 are based upon WBO (SCP-Processing). Figures for 1997 from the
Jaarboek Emancipatie (1999) and based upon CBS Huishoudensstatistiek (1997). The sub-categories
for 1997 come from the survey ‘Caring for Work’ (Van Wel and Knijn, 2000).
two-parent families were in long-term poverty
(De Vries, 1999). The definition of lone
mothers as a group at risk of poverty which
would have severe consequences for their chil-
dren’s well-being contributed to the idea of
lone mothers as a social problem (Engbersen
and Van der Veen, 1987; Van Gelder, 1987).
At that time, however, such a definition did
not result in an improvement of welfare bene-
fits. This had been passed over for two other
reasons: the official equal opportunities policy
and the tendency to ‘re-activate’ people on
welfare for budgetary reasons.
Feminist concepts that were incorporated
into the framework of the Council for Equal
Opportunities4 (that has pleaded against
Dutch women’s economic dependency since
the 1980s) also contributed to the new welfare
policy. Although the Council has always con-
sidered the care of children, its main concern
was women’s independence of male incomes
through the individualization of taxation,
social security and paid work. In 1984, the
Dutch government recognized many of the
Equal Opportunity Council’s claims. In a
white paper entitled ‘Equal Opportunities’ it
stated:
The Government accepts that all citizens are
responsible for their own personal lives and
it will contribute to create social conditions
to make individual choices possible. This
implies that, in the context of economic
independence, the consequences of partner-
ships, for instance marriage, and the choice
to have children, also fall under the individ-
ual’s responsibility for work and income. It
is, however, no longer assumed that the
implications of parenthood for women, in
contrast to those for men, are to care and
do the housekeeping all and every day
throughout their entire lives. In the light of
equal opportunities, raising children has to
be combined with paid work by men and
women on an equal basis. (TK, 1984–1985:
11)
This text, formulated in the context of what is
still a very strong bread winner regime, is
aimed at removing the barriers to women’s
entry into the labour market (to create the
social conditions which will make individual
choice possible). It states that individuals have
their own responsibility for their personal
lifestyles (including having children), and it
redefines the gendered division of care and
work. This governmental equal opportunities
policy opened the door for including lone
mothers in the welfare reforms of the 1990s.
This was further reinforced by a report by the
Scientific Council for Governmental Policy5
which challenged the comparatively low
labour-participation rates in the Netherlands
and suggested integrating the enormous
reserve of housewives into the labour market
(WRR, 1990).
While the 1996 welfare reform definitively
changes the gender assumptions with regard
to lone mothers from caring to employed
motherhood, it is also ambivalent. At the time
the law was implemented, no policies were in
force to support lone mothers in their double
responsibilities, nor was a conditional right to
child care included in the law. After-school
care, necessary for mothers with children of
school age, is very slowly developing in the
Netherlands (only 4 percent of all children of
school age are covered) and if it is available it
is generally of poor quality. Another point is
that, according to the law, municipalities have
to take into account mothers’ caring responsi-
bilities, but again no clarity is given about
what this means. It is not clear how the
assumption to help lone mothers out of
poverty by them finding a job should be
weighed in relation to the assumption of
dealing with mothers’ care responsibilities.
This is even more complicated since the
Department of Social Affairs promotes a part-
time work strategy for men and women, in
particular when they have children. This per-
spective was prepared by the governmental
advisory Committee for Future Scenarios6
(1995) and accepted as the governmental
equal opportunities strategy. In several minis-
terial documents such as Kansen op
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Combineren (opportunities for combining,
1997) and Naar een nieuw evenwicht tussen
zorg en arbeid (towards a new balance
between work and care, 1999), the so-called
‘combination scenario’ is put forward. This
scenario involves a working week of a
maximum of 32 hours for both men and
women in order to give them both the oppor-
tunity of combining work and care, with the
assumption that as a couple they will share
work and care. With regard to lone mothers,
this policy has had an unforeseen effect: the
question ‘Does what counts for partnered
parents also count for lone parents and, if so,
who will support lone parents’ part-time
work?’ has remained on the political agenda
till today. This governmental combination
strategy has led to considerable confusion
about the work requirements in the new social
assistance law, and is partly why lone mothers
and local caseworkers are resistant to full-time
employment for lone mothers.
Shortly after the implementation of the
welfare reform the Dutch government, in reac-
tion to the first public comments on the law,
introduced some additional provisions to
support lone mothers’ re-entry into the labour
market. The new administration (a coalition
of social democrats, social liberals and right-
wing liberals) became aware of the cultural
shock the reform had caused. Protest was
heard from all over the country and the media
spent considerable time exposing the harsh
implications of the law. In early 1996, the
government decided to introduce an extra tax
reduction (instead of 6 percent, working lone
mothers could now deduct 12 percent of their
income before they had to pay tax) and an
earnings disregard (called premium for part-
time work) of Gld 250 a month for lone
parents. In addition, Gld 85m a year was made
available for child care and can be applied for
by the municipalities (Staatscourant 43,
1996). These measures show that directly
after the welfare reform, the Dutch govern-
ment felt the need for national incentives to
encourage its aims to be put into practice. It
has to be said, however, that neither the gov-
ernment, nor local authorities responsible for
implementing the law, has a clear idea of the
law’s impact on lone-parent families. It was
striking how soon it was realized that very
little was known about the characteristics of
lone mothers on welfare, of their attitudes and
capacities, their levels of education and ability
to enter employment. Insight was also lacking
into how the different objectives of the law
could be combined: should work be priori-
tized above child care or poverty reduction,
and what must be done if mothers opt for
part-time work only? It was at the local
authorities’ discretion to interpret the law as
they saw fit (Knijn and Van Wel, 1999).
Poor support and poor results
Lone mothers in the Netherlands are not at all
in agreement with the welfare reform. This is
not surprising when one considers the enor-
mous ideological shift from caring to working
motherhood in the new welfare regime. It is
interesting that not only lone mothers on
welfare but also the majority of working lone
mothers who have never been on welfare are
not in agreement with the welfare reform (see
Table 2).
The main counter-argument of lone
mothers, whether they are employed or not, is
that mothers should be able to decide them-
selves when the moment is right for them to
seek employment. This also explains why
employed mothers do not support the law.
This does not mean that lone mothers do not
want to have paid work. The majority of the
employed mothers (84 percent) and many of
the lone mothers on welfare (56 percent) con-
firmed that a combination of caring for chil-
dren and paid work brings variation to one’s
life, contributes to self-esteem and self-devel-
opment, and is important for social contacts
and autonomy. However, lone mothers on
welfare, unlike employed lone parents, do not
expect that paid work will contribute much to
their income. They also see more disadvan-
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tages in combining work and care than
employed lone parents do. They stress that it
should not harm the children and that it is
only the mother herself who can decide about
when the moment and conditions are right to
go to work (Van Wel and Knijn, 2000).
In practice we see that lone mothers on
welfare are not very eager to find a job.
Although about two-thirds of the lone
mothers on welfare say that they want to
come off welfare, only some of them are inten-
sively seeking work. Schooling and training
are preferred activities. Almost half of the lone
mothers on welfare have taken the opportu-
nity, offered by the new welfare law, to follow
courses and training programmes that will
improve their capacities for work.
Because of the repetitive character of our
research, we were able to see how many lone
mothers on welfare actually came off social
assistance. The results are rather disappoint-
ing: not more than 12 percent left welfare last
year. When one bears in mind that lone
mothers are on welfare for an average of six
years, an average of 16 percent should have
been expected, even without additional incen-
tives such as a new law including the work
obligation. This implies that under the new
law, probably fewer lone mothers left social
assistance than ever before. The percentage of
lone mothers on welfare who have found a
job is also not very encouraging (Table 3).
About a quarter of these mothers had a paid
job in combination with a benefit; a year later
about a third of the lone mothers on welfare
combined a paid job with an additional
benefit (Van Wel and Knijn, 2000).
The most remarkable conclusion of our
research concerns the number of exemptions
from the work obligation made by local offi-
cials. About 60 percent of all lone mothers on
welfare who do not have children younger
than five years old are exempted from the full
obligation to work (36 percent are fully
DUTCH WELFARE REFORM FOR LONE MOTHERS 243
Journal of European Social Policy 2001 11 (3)
Table 2 Acceptability among lone mothers of the welfare reform’s work obligation for lone parents
with children above 5 years (%).
Preferred work obligation Lone mothers on welfare Lone parents not on welfare
N = 452 N = 688
No obligation 52 34
20 hours or less 31 37
21–36 hours 4 9
Partly (no details) 5 8
Full obligation 6 8
Unknown 2 3
Table 3 Current activities of lone mothers on welfare (schooling, work, exemptions from the work
obligation)
Activities Lone mothers on welfare Lone parents not on welfare
N = 452 (%) N = 688 (%)
Economic independence by paid work 12 72
Work and welfare benefit 26 0
Work and additional income 2 16
Welfare benefits only 58 0
Other income sources (e.g. social 
security, widow pensions) 2 11
Voluntary work 27 21
Education during the last two years 49 60
Exempted from the work obligation 54 —
Partly exempted from the work obligation 18 —
exempted, 25 percent have a part-time work
obligation only) (Van Wel and Knijn, 2000).
This is astonishing because it means that a
majority of the social category that the law is
aimed at is in fact excluded from its coverage.
The question of course is ‘Why?’: are local
caseworkers and lone mothers deliberately
trying to subvert the law or are these mothers
simply not capable of becoming employed
without additional support?
Obstacles to getting off welfare
Lone mothers on welfare differ in one crucial
aspect from lone parents not on welfare: their
educational level is much lower. A large
majority (almost two-thirds) of the lone
mothers on welfare has not completed inter-
mediate vocational training and 37 percent of
these mothers did not pass exams in their final
education. In contrast, almost 60 percent of
the lone parents who earn their own living
have higher professional qualifications (social
work, journalism, nursing, graphic design etc.)
or an academic degree. Elsewhere, we have
demonstrated by means of a LISREL analysis
that this factor is of major importance –
together with health, working history and
work ethos – for lone mothers’ participation
in the labour market (Van Wel and Knijn,
2001). Here we will focus on the role that
gendered assumptions held by lone mothers
play in coming off welfare and how these
assumptions reduce their opportunity to make
use of incentives to combine work and care.
Given the idea that ‘gendered moral ration-
alities’ (Duncan and Edwards, 1996) may
influence lone mothers’ efforts in finding
work, we studied the motherhood assump-
tions of both employed lone parents and lone
mothers on welfare. A systematic comparison
of several subgroups of lone mothers could
provide evidence in support of this argument.
Being aware of the fact that respondents 
to a survey tend to answer more ‘politically
correctly’ if the questions are impersonally
formulated, and this is particularly so in the
Netherlands (Knijn, 1994; Hakim, 2000), the
statements were formulated in a personal
way.7 Mainly due to the enormous differences
in educational level, the care and work ethos
of the two groups of lone mothers did indeed
differ systematically.8 Lone mothers on
welfare, mostly with low educational qualifi-
cations, have a (statistically tested) signifi-
cantly higher care ethos (score of 3.9 on a
5-point scale) than lone parents not on
welfare, who are mostly highly educated
(score of 3.4), but interestingly enough this is
not true for the work ethos, which is the same
for both groups (2.5 on a 5-point scale). In its
turn, the high care ethos of lone mothers on
welfare influences other factors that might be
crucial in obtaining a job. Lone mothers on
welfare whose care ethos dominates their
work ethos do not wish to come off welfare,
are much less occupied in looking for a job,
disapprove more of public child care and
foresee more problems in combining work
and care (Van Wel and Knijn, 2000). Because
of this combination of low education and a
high care ethos, lone mothers on welfare have
problems in making use of financial and care
incentives that are meant to help them out of
welfare.
For lone mothers, potential earnings are a
crucial factor for finding work. In line with its
official combination policy, the Department of
Social Affairs and Employment states that
lone mothers should be capable of leaving the
welfare system if they could work a maximum
of 32 hours a week. An earnings disregard
and tax reductions are available for this
purpose. Working lone parents who do not
depend on welfare do indeed work on average
30 hours a week; 43 percent work more than
32 hours a week and only 8 percent work less
than 20 hours a week. On the basis of their
average income, we have calculated the
minimum hours a mother has to work to
come off welfare.9 These calculations show
that women with lower educational qualifica-
tions would have to work a minimum of 32
hours, while parents with higher educational
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qualifications can manage on about 24 hours
a week (Van Wel and Knijn, 2000). By impli-
cation, lone mothers with lower educational
qualifications would only be able to improve
their income if they worked almost full time.
However, their care ethos does not allow them
to do so, and they work even less than the
mothers with higher educational qualifica-
tions. Instead, lone mothers with lower educa-
tional qualifications either do not work – and
receive unemployment benefits (33 percent) –
or work part time (25 percent) and receive
benefits. These options, however, do not help
to improve their income. Opportunities for
lone mothers to find additional income could
also contribute to their willingness to find a
job. When, for instance, alimony, child
allowances or part-time premiums can be
added to earnings from part-time work, it
would be easier to reduce the working week
to the hours preferred. Yet our research shows
that mothers with lower educational qualifica-
tions not only have the lowest incomes from
paid work, but they also receive the least
alimony. The middle and more highly edu-
cated lone parents have better opportunities 
to improve their earned income, because 
they receive more alimony (Table 4). By 
implication, lone mothers on welfare seem to
be caught in a dilemma. If they want to come
off welfare they will have to accept an almost
full-time job due to their low hourly wages
and the lack of financial support by ex-part-
ners. This is, however, not in accordance with
their care ethos and assumptions about moth-
erhood, which say that they should care for
their children as much as possible.
Less highly educated lone mothers also
make less use of child care despite the fact that
specific subsidies for child care are available if
municipalities apply for them. The reason
behind this incentive is that most lone mothers
cannot fulfil the responsibilities for care and
work all by themselves. Studies have indeed
shown that these new incentives help in stimu-
lating lone mothers to find work, although
this seldom results in them coming off welfare
(Van den Akker et al., 1998). One problem is
that for schoolchildren hardly any after-school
care is available, while another is that many
lone parents do not regard public child care as
a good alternative to their own care. This
means that lone parents need other forms of
support for child care. When we compare
both groups of lone parents, we see a great
diversity in their use of child care (Table 5).
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Table 4 Income package of lone parents not on welfare
Educational level % employed % receiving alimony % receiving other
than welfare benefits
Low 69 26 35
Middle 89 42 20
High 92 38 15
Table 5 Child care and care package (%)
Sources of care Lone mothers on Lone parents not Lone parents not Lone parents not
welfare (452) on welfare on welfare on welfare
(lower ed./N: 98) (middle ed./N: 197) (high ed./N: 393)
Former partner/ co-parent 10 14 20 44
Family, friends 27 31 48 48
Public child care 15 15 20 29
Paid childminder 7 4 12 32
No child care 62 31
Care package 22 23 37 56
[footnote included earlier]
This can be partly explained by the fact that
lone mothers on welfare require less support;
they undertake the care themselves. We there-
fore differentiated between lone parents 
with lower, middle and higher educational
qualifications not on welfare to see whether
they all received the same kind of support.
Once again, it was the (working) parents with
lower educational qualifications who received
the least support. Not only do they make sub-
stantially less use of public care provisions,
they also, contrary to our expectations, 
have less support from family and friends.
Maybe the most striking conclusion is that
their ex-partners barely play a role in caring
for the children in contrast to the ex-partners
of lone parents with middle and higher 
educational qualifications (Van Wel and
Knijn, 2000).
We have to conclude that the welfare
reform seems to suit lone parents with higher
educational qualifications in particular. It is
not too problematic for them to earn a living
by working a maximum of 32 hours a week;
their care ethos is less dominant than their
work ethos; they have longer working histo-
ries and more often they have some freedom
in arranging their working hours too. Finally,
they are more able to organize considerable
care support, mainly by sharing care with
their former partners. Ironically, however, the
welfare reform is not that significant for these
lone parents. They are unlikely to be on
welfare and, for the most part, never have
been. In contrast, lone parents with lower
educational qualifications and on welfare lack
the appropriate ‘gender attitude’ for work to
prevail above care, do not appreciate public
child care and foresee more problems in com-
bining work and care. In addition, they
cannot expect much financial progress from
obtaining work and would have to work full
time to earn an income which is above the
welfare level. Moreover, they lack good care-
support either by their former partners or
public care provisions. This is why they try to
evade and resist the new law, claiming the
need for better support as the only condition
for finding employment. How do local case-
workers and local policymakers react to this?
Careful or lenient: local discretion
ambivalence
A new parliamentary debate in 1999 demon-
strated the ambivalence of local authorities in
implementing welfare reform for lone
mothers. In this debate, under-secretary
Verstand presented two options for dealing
with lone mothers on welfare in the future.
The first option would be to extend the law to
all lone mothers no matter how old their chil-
dren were, although mothers of children
younger than five would be obliged to work
only part time. The second option would
maintain the current age restriction and
reduce the work obligation for mothers with
children from the ages of 5 to 12 to a
maximum of 24 hours a week. Verstand
herself emphasizes that based on all the advice
she received from social organizations, advi-
sory boards and municipalities, and on the
basis of the current practice, the second
option was preferable (Ministerie van Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1999). From the
15 organizations (trade unions, employers’
organizations, national women’s organiza-
tions and organizations responsible for social
security) who responded, most opposed the
work obligation for lone mothers with chil-
dren below the age of 5. These organizations
also supported the option to reduce the work
obligation for lone mothers with children
below the age of 12 years (some even said 16
years) to a part-time obligation. Among these
organizations were the Association of Dutch
Municipalities (Vereniging Nederlandse
Gemeenten: VNG) and the National
Organization of Heads of Social Services
(Directeuren van Sociale Diensten: DIVOSA)
who together represented all levels of the
administration of the welfare reform all over
the country (Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment, 1999). Their advice confirms
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the current implementation of the welfare
reform and is understandable in view of the
ambivalence demonstrated by the local policy-
makers and caseworkers we interviewed
(Knijn and Van Wel, 1999).10 The majority of
local policymakers and caseworkers regard
the welfare reform as a challenge to stimulate
lone mothers to join the labour market. All
five municipalities in our study had applied
for subsidies to extend local child-care provi-
sions and they had interviewed all lone
mothers on welfare. They also made use of the
additional premiums for part-time work, and
have developed new training programmes and
work processes. Nevertheless, almost none of
our interviewees were optimistic about the
opportunities for getting a majority of the
lone mothers out of the welfare system. All
anticipated labour market problems, in partic-
ular for the mothers with lower educational
qualifications. A major argument is that the
female part of the lowest segment of the
labour market is developing into a part-time
market, among others, in (health) care, shops
and other services. The wages earned in these
sorts of jobs are too low to provide an income
that is high enough to relinquish social assis-
tance when only working part time. The case-
workers say that employers are not
particularly eager to offer mothers of young
children full-time jobs, especially if it costs
more because of child-care payments. Other
external barriers mentioned by local policy-
makers and even more by the caseworkers, are
associated with the administrative and
bureaucratic complexities of the governmental
incentives; a reason for not making use of
them especially if they offer no perspective of
getting a mother off welfare. One example
may illustrate this. The well trained casework-
ers (all have higher professional education) are
well-aware that it is at their discretion to
encourage lone mothers to get a part-time job;
the law even supports this in cases where the
mother has schoolchildren. However, offering
mothers part-time jobs is not favoured by
caseworkers. They say that this means a lot of
extra work for them, for example, in applying
for earnings disregard and finding child care.
When they consider these extra administrative
investments in conjunction with the fact that a
part-time job will not enable lone mothers to
leave the welfare system, many caseworkers
opt for the easiest option and keep the lone
mothers on the welfare records. This is even
more so since they know that the poverty gap
will widen between a part-time job plus earn-
ings disregard, child-care benefits and addi-
tional social assistance on the one hand and
an income from paid work without all these
extras on the other. In such cases, they say,
there is simply no stimulus for lone mothers to
ever look for a full-time job (Knijn and Van
Wel, 1999).
In addition, many municipalities admit that
they are not prepared to support lone mothers
in finding work. The discretion to implement
working policies for lone mothers is a com-
pletely new task for them to fulfil. For decades
they were only required to take care of pay-
ments for these mothers who had not even the
right to education beyond the lowest levels.
Now they have been granted the discretion to
implement welfare reform, they can barely
handle it. With some exceptions, communica-
tion concerning the local objectives of this law
had been unclear for the caseworkers, as some
were not even aware of what processes the
employment offices had developed and also
lacked insight into the lone mothers’ working
capacities. Most municipalities had not devel-
oped a specific policy to treat lone mothers
differently from other welfare claimants and
they felt rather insecure about how far they
could go in enforcing lone mothers to find
work against their will. Time after time, we
heard the following: ‘We prefer stimulation to
enforcement’, which implies that only those
lone mothers who are very keen to relinquish
social assistance will be supported.
Together these factors explain why so many
lone mothers are exempt from the obligation
to work full time. When their caseworker has
to fill in the ‘categorization form’, including
four categories ranging from ‘immediately
suited to find work’ to ‘not available for the
DUTCH WELFARE REFORM FOR LONE MOTHERS 247
Journal of European Social Policy 2001 11 (3)
labour market’, this is a decisive moment. It is
not only the mother’s own working capacities
which count, but also her family life, the chil-
dren’s well-being, potential problems of the
children, her own health and that of the chil-
dren which are relevant. Once it has been
decided that the claimant belongs to the
fourth category, no further action is taken
until the next interview that will not take
place (in most municipalities) for another 18
months. Paradoxically this also means that
lone mothers who want to come off welfare
are not offered much assistance; about a third
of the lone mothers in our research who
wanted to find work stated that they had not
seen a caseworker in the last year (Van Wel
and Knijn, 2000).
Our conclusion is that the local discre-
tionary powers function as a real gatekeeper
(Lipsky, 1979) for lone mothers who cannot
or will not find a paid job. In this respect they
really perform a caring job, protecting lone
mothers on welfare against a welfare reform
that they as well as the lone mothers experi-
ence as a harsh one. The other side of the
coin, however, is that this strategy keeps many
lone mothers on the poverty level and does
not help them to find good work processes or
additional support. In this sense, the local
authority is acting rather leniently and is
neglecting the double obligation of lone
mothers on welfare. This ambivalence reflects
the assumptions about motherhood held by
local policymakers and caseworkers. To a
certain degree, they accept the shift from
caring to employed motherhood and agree
that lone mothers who are capable of earning
their own living should do so. They have also
developed several kinds of support to help
these mothers. But they are also hesitant
about enforcing lone mothers to find employ-
ment, partly because of the lack of good
prospects for these mothers if they come off
welfare, but also because they do not believe
that earning an income should dominate over
good care of the children. In this respect, they
identify with the mothers’ gender assump-
tions, and the mothers’ own contentions that
only they can take good care of the children.
In such cases, local caseworkers try to per-
suade mothers to look for alternatives, but
sanctions are not taken against them if they
insist on caring for their children themselves
(Van Wel and Knijn, 2000).
Conclusion
Welfare reforms concerning lone mothers in
the Netherlands have proven not to be very
successful. Four years after the implementa-
tion of the new social assistance law (nABW),
only slightly more than one out of ten lone
mothers have left the welfare system and new
parliamentary debates about the future of the
system are in preparation. In the autumn of
2000, the Minister of Social Affairs
(Vermeend) presented a new strategy to
encourage lone mothers to leave the welfare
system. The government refuses to accept the
poor results of the 1996 welfare reform for
lone mothers, mainly because of the severe
labour market shortage, in particular in the
field of education and care (health care as well
as home care). The argument is that it is unac-
ceptable for so many mothers to live on social
assistance benefits while so many jobs in the
feminized part of the labour market are
unfilled. Parliament is ready to accept this
argument on the condition that the new strat-
egy safeguards the interests of lone mothers
and their children. The main elements of the
new proposal therefore include additional
subsidies for child care and schooling as well
as extra tax reductions. In contrast to the gov-
ernment’s 1999 proposal, lone mothers of
children up to the age of 5 will not receive an
‘active’ work obligation, although municipali-
ties are encouraged to also offer work and
schooling processes that have to be accepted
by the lone mothers. Part of the new strategy
is that the government reached an agreement
with the organization representing Dutch
municipalities. On the basis of several studies,
it has been concluded that the local authorities
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have not invested enough in realizing the aims
of the welfare reform. From now on, munici-
palities will have to report annually on what
efforts they have made to stimulate lone
mothers’ labour market participation and
what the results are (Letter from the Minister
of Social Affairs to Parliament, 29 September,
2000). Yet it may be clear that the outcome of
these new initiatives cannot be predicted. The
poor results of the welfare reform are partly
due to disagreements about gendered morali-
ties, and, in particular, about the meaning of
motherhood. The national social policy
assumes that mothers as well as fathers should
combine work and care responsibilities. This
assumption is also applicable for lone mothers
although it is acknowledged that sharing work
and care will be more problematic for them.
To improve their opportunities for combining
work and care, financial incentives to earn
their own living by working part time (= 32
hours a week) as well as specific child-care
subsidies have been provided. In general, lone
parents with higher educational qualifications
agree with the assumptions of the reform and,
due to their higher incomes, they have the
opportunity of arranging income as well as
their care package, and they do not therefore
have problems in meeting these assumptions.
This is why they are seldom on welfare and a
majority of them never has been. In contrast,
lone parents with lower educational qualifica-
tions do not agree with the gender assumption
of putting the work ethos above the care
ethos, and due to their lower income and lack
of opportunities to arrange the income and
care package, they are unable to meet the gov-
ernments’ criteria. Most of these lone parents
are therefore on welfare and will remain so.
Local policymakers and caseworkers who
have been granted discretionary powers to
implement the welfare reform have in practice
demonstrated ambivalence. In general, they
agree with the national objectives but they
also resist too rigid an interpretation of the
reform; moreover they reject the full-time
work obligation for lone mothers who have a
strong care ethos. They are also hesitant to
enforce lone mothers into jobs which may not
improve their income, not least because this
demands a lot of additional work for the local
caseworkers themselves. They are indeed
careful as well as lenient gatekeepers.
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Notes
1 Income packages consist of a combination of
several financial resources, for instance income
from work in combination with benefits or
alimony.
2 The first study is based upon a representative
sample of lone mothers on welfare and includes
1% of the whole population of welfare mothers
randomly selected in five cities in the
Netherlands. The second study is based upon a
randomly selected sample of lone parents not on
welfare in one middle-sized town in the
Netherlands. 
3 Both studies are financially supported by the
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en
Werkgelegenheid) and by the Ministry of Public
Health, Welfare and Sport (Ministerie van
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport). The first
research of 1,063 lone mothers on welfare was
conducted in 1998, the second research of 452
of these mothers and 688 lone parents not on
welfare was conducted in 1999.
4 The Council for Equal Opportunities
(Emancipatie Raad) is a government advisory
board concerned with gender issues. It was
founded as an independent organization to
advise the government about equal opportunities
policy in 1981. In 1997 several ad hoc advisory
committees replaced this council.
5 The Scientific Council for Governmental Policy
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regerings-
beleid, WRR) is an independent advisory board
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for governmental policy running its own
research department. It mainly advises on long-
term social processes regarding social security,
employment and demography. 
6 This Committee for Future Scenarios
(Commissie Toekomstscenario’s Herverdeling
Onbetaalde Arbeid) is one of the ad hoc inde-
pendent advisory committees that the Ministry
of Social Affairs set up to outline future care and
work policy. 
7 For instance, we did not ask the more general
question ‘child care is not a good option for
young children’, but phrased the question as
follows: ‘The most important thing in life is pro-
viding a pleasant home for one’s children.’
8 Both the work ethos and the care ethos are
measured by four items. The work ethos consists
of the questions: 1) a paid job is a source of hap-
piness, 2) a paid job is crucial, 3) a job; that is
what I prefer above everything else, 4) I want to
do everything to get a paid job. The care ethos
consists of the questions: 1) the best thing in life
is to take care of one’s children, 2) a happy life
for your children is crucial, 3) the most impor-
tant thing in life is providing a pleasant home for
one’s children, 4) one lives for one’s children.
The relationship between the two ethoses is cal-
culated by the difference between the means of
the two scales.
9 It would mean that she would have to earn
about Gld 400 more than the welfare benefit to
compensate for housing subsidies, municipal tax
reductions and additional benefits.
10 Group interviews were held with caseworkers
and local policymakers in five Dutch cities:
Amersfoort, Apeldoorn, The Hague, Utrecht and
Zaanstad. Fifty caseworkers and local policy-
makers participated in these interviews.
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